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ARTICLES 
When Counsel Abandonment Forecloses 
Post-Conviction Relief: An Argument 
for Applying the Doctrine of Cause and 
Prejudice to the AEDPA Statute of Limitations 
Katherine I. Puzone* 
"Abandoned by counsel, Maples was left unrepresented at a critical time for 
his state post-conviction petition, and he lacked a clue of any need to protect 
himself prose. In these circumstances, no just system would lay the default at 
Maples' death-cell door." 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Justice Ginsberg, writing for the majority in Maples v. Thomas, painted a stark 
picture of the injustice facing a death-row inmate who was abandoned by his 
attorneys. This Article uses the case of Robin Myers to illustrate the inconsis-
tency in the law that applies when a post-conviction petitioner is abandoned by 
his attorney. The result of this inconsistency is that the same court reached 
opposite conclusions in the cases of two men on death row in Alabama. The 
distinguishing fact between the two cases is not counsel's abandonment of his 
client in the midst of complex post-conviction proceedings, but rather the 
procedural posture of the two cases. In Maples,2 even though the petitioner was 
abandoned by his attorneys, he discovered the abandonment before the federal 
statute of limitations lapsed. 3 In fact, the Office of the Alabama Attorney General 
notified Mr. Maples that the deadline to file an appeal with the Alabama Court of 
Criminal Appeals had lapsed and specifically informed him that only four weeks 
remained to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.4 While new 
counsel filed a timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, the 
* Associate Professor of Law, Barry University Duane 0. Andreas School of Law. J.D., cum /aude, 
New York University School of Law, M. Phil. University of Cambridge, B.A. Trinity College. This 
Article is dedicated to Robin Myers whose friendship, kindness, and bravery inspire me every day. 
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I. Maple v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 917 (2011). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
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claims raised in state court were considered "procedurally defaulted" because 
they had not been presented to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the 
Alabama Supreme Court.5 In Maples, the United States Supreme Court held that 
counsel's abandonment of Mr. Maples excused the procedural default, thus 
allowing full federal review of the claims asserted in Mr. Maples' petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus.6 
In another Alabama case, the courts denied review because the petitioner, 
Robin Myers, was not notified of counsel's abandonment until after the federal 
statute of limitations had run.7 The requirements to excuse a statute of limitations 
default are different than those that excuse a procedural default. 8 Excusing a 
statute of limitations default requires a showing that the petitioner was "diligent" 
in protecting his rights, a showing not required to excuse a procedural default.9 
Thus, in stark contrast to the result in Maples, Mr. Myers will likely be executed 
without any federal court having reviewed his federal constitutional claims. 10 
Contrary to Justice Ginsberg's majority opinion in Maples, the default has been 
"laid at [Mr. Myers'] death-cell door." 11 
II. THE POST-CONVICTION PROCESS 12 
People often refer to the lengthy appellate process in capital cases. What 
many do not realize is that most of that process is not an appeal, but rather 
post-conviction. 13 Once a defendant is convicted and sentenced to death, the 
state appellate courts review the case. 14 Once the conviction and sentence are 
affirmed, the defendant may petition the United States Supreme Court to review 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. See Myers v. Allen, 420 Fed. App'x 924, 927 (I Ith Cir. 2011). 
8. See Maples, 123 S. Ct. at 922 ("Cause for a procedural default exists where "something external to 
the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him[,] ... 'impeded [his] efforts to comply 
with the State's procedural rule.") (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991), quoting 
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). In contrast, a statute of limitations default can only be 
cured when a petitioner demonstrates that equitable tolling is warranted. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
63I (2010) (holding that the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d) can be equitably 
tolled in appropriate cases). Equitable tolling requires the petitioner to show "(!) that he has been 
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way" and 
prevented timely filing." Id., quoting, Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). 
9. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (equitable tolling requires a showing by the petitioner that "he has 
been pursuing his rights diligently"); Maples, 123 S. Ct. at 922 (demonstrating "cause" for a procedural 
default requires a showing by the petitioner that something external to the petitioner caused the default). 
10. See Myers, 420 Fed. Appx. At 928. 
11. Maples, 123 S. Ct. at 917. 
12. This Part of the Article is intended as a general overview of post-conviction procedure for those 
unfamiliar with this stage of litigation in capital cases. It is not in any way intended to be an exhaustive 
description of this complex area of the law. 
13. See RANDY HERTZ & JAMES LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3.5(a)(6) (LexisNexis, 6th ed. 201 l) (describing the role of state post-conviction proceedings). 
14. Id. at§ 5.1. 
No. 3) Cause & Prejudice and AEDPA 367 
his case. 15 Once that petition is denied, or the time to file such a petition has 
expired, the conviction and sentence are deemed final. 16 
Once a conviction and death sentence become final, everything changes. The 
process with which most people are familiar is essentially turned on its head. The 
defendant has lost the presumption of innocence and must petition the courts for 
relief from an unconstitutional conviction or sentence. 17 The petitioner must 
seek review first in the state courts, most often by filing a post-conviction petition 
with the same judge who presided over his trial. 18 The grounds for state 
post-conviction relief are narrow 19 and any issues that could have been, but were 
not, raised on direct appeal are barred.20 Discovery is limited and evidentiary 
hearings are rarely granted.21 Each claim that the petitioner plans to raise in state 
or federal court, along with its supporting facts, must be set out in the initial state 
post-conviction petition.22 If the state trial court denies post-conviction relief, 
all claims in the initial post-conviction petition must be presented to the state 
appellate courts.23 Once the state post-conviction process is complete, the 
petitioner may petition for relief in federal court.24 
In state capital cases, post-conviction relief in federal court is governed by 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).25 The 
petitioner files a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the warden of the 
state's prison system alleging that he is being held in custody by the state in 
15. Id. 
16. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 295 (1989) (defining "final" to mean a case "where the 
judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for 
certiorari had elapsed") (internal citation omitted). 
17. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1993). 
18. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. PRo. 32.5 ("Petitions filed under this rule shall be filed in and decided by 
the court in which the petitioner was convicted. If a petition is filed in another court, it shall be transferred 
to the court where the conviction occurred"); see also ALA. R. CRIM. PRO. 32.1 ("any defendant who has 
been convicted of a criminal offense may institute a proceeding in the court of original conviction"). 
19. See, e.g .. ALA. R. CRIM PRO. 32.1; see HERTLAND LIEBMAN, supra note 13, at§§ 7.1, 7.2. 
20. See, e.g .. ALA. R. CRIM. PRO. 32.2; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1973) (holding that 
claims not presented in state appellate proceedings in conformity with state procedural rules are not 
cognizable in federal habeas proceedings absent a showing of cause and prejudice); Engle v. Isaac, 
456 U.S. 107 ( 1982) (applying the rule of Wainwright to bar federal habeas review of claims not raised at 
trial by a contemporaneous objection as required by state procedural rules). 
21. See Christopher Flood, Closing the Circle: Case v. Nebraska and the Future of Habeas Reform, 
27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 633, 657 (2001-02). 
22. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, at § 6.2 ("federal exhaustion and procedural default 
doctrines compel prisoners, when permitted by state law and practice, to include in their state 
postconviction applications all claims that might warrant federal habeas corpus relief and that were not 
exhaustively litigated at trial and on direct appeal in the same case."). 
23. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, at§ 23; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 (b)-(c) (requiring exhaustion of 
all available state remedies as a predicate to seeking federal habeas relief); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 
( 1982) (holding that a federal district court must dismiss a federal habeas petition containing both 
exhausted and unexhausted claims). 
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (providing remedies in federal court for state prisoners). 
25. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2013)). 
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violation of his federal constitutional rights.26 AEDPA contains very strict 
procedural rules and a one-year statute of limitations that runs from the time the 
conviction becomes final.27 This statute of limitations is tolled during state 
post-conviction proceedings.28 A federal court can only grant relief if the 
petitioner demonstrates that the state court ruling "resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."29 
As noted above, all claims presented to a federal habeas court must be properly 
raised and litigated in state court. For example, all claims must be "exhausted" 
before being presented to a federal court, meaning that there are no avenues of 
relief open to the petitioner in state court.3° Claims cannot be "procedurally 
defaulted" if they are to be raised in federal court.3 1 A procedural default occurs 
when a claim is raised in the state trial court and is not presented to the state 
appellate courts. 32 
The difference between a procedural default and a failure to exhaust was 
explained by Justice Stevens in his dissent in O'Sullivan v. Boerckel.33 A claim is 
unexhausted if the petitioner still has an available avenue to pursue relief in 
state court.34 In that case, principles of comity and federalism require a petitioner 
to seek relief in state court prior to seeking federal habeas relief. 35 "[T]he 
exhaustion inquiry focuses entirely on the availability of state procedures at the 
26. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004) (the correct respondent in a federal petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus is "the person who has custody over [the petitioner]"), quoting, 28 U.S.C. § 2242; 
see also § 2243 (a writ of habeas corpus "shall be directed to the person having custody of the person 
detained"). 
27. See§ 2244(d)(I). 
28. See§ 2244 (d)(2) ("The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or 
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted 
toward any period of limitation under this subsection.") 
29. § 2254(d)(I ). 
30. See HERT/. & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, at§ 23; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 (b)-(c) (requiring exhaustion of 
all available state remedies as a predicate to seeking federal habeas relief. 
31. See Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922 ("As a rule, a state prisoner's habeas claims may not be entertained 
by a federal court "when (I) 'a state court [has) declined to address [those] claims because the prisoner 
had failed to meet a state procedural requirement,' and (2) 'the state judgment rests on independent and 
adequate state procedural grounds."' quoting Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S.--,--, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 
1127 (2011) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S., at 729-730). 
32. The bar to federal review may be lifted, however, if "the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the 
[procedural] default [in state court] and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal 
law." Id. at 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546; see also Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 84-85. 
33. 526 U.S. 838 (1999). 
34. Id. (The question of exhaustion "refers only to remedies still available at the time of the federal 
petition, it requires federal courts to ask whether an applicant for federal relief could still get the relief he 
seeks in the state system.") (internal quotation and citations omitted) (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
35. Id. ("If the applicant currently has a state avenue available for raising his claims, a federal court, in 
the interest of comity, must generally abstain from intervening. This time-honored rule has developed 
over several decades of cases, always with the goal of respecting the States' interest in passing first on 
their prisoners' constitutional claims in order to act as the primary guarantor of those prisoners' federal 
rights, and always separate and apart from rules of waiver.") (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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time when the federal court is asked to entertain a habeas petition."36 In contrast, 
the doctrine of procedural default focuses on a petitioner's waiver of certain 
claims.37 If a state prisoner fails to raise a claim in an available state proceeding, 
and no avenue to raise the claim in state court remains at the time the petition for 
federal habeas relief is filed, the claim is considered procedurally defaulted.38 A 
procedural default can only be cured upon a showing of "cause and prejudice"39 
or a "fundamental miscarriage of justice."4° Cause in this context is defined as 
"something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed 
to him."41 In sum, before seeking federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must 
"invok[e] one complete round of the State's established appellate review 
process."42 
As noted above, AEDPA contains a very strict one-year statute of limitations. 
A federal habeas petitioner must file his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
federal court within one year of one of four statutory triggering dates.43 The text 
of AEDPA provides that the statute of limitations is tolled while a properly filed 
state petition for post-conviction relief is pending.44 In cases in which a timely 
petition for federal habeas review is not filed, the Supreme Court has held that the 
AEDPA statute of limitations is a non-jurisdictional statute of limitations that can 
be equitably tolled.45 In other words, a statute of limitations default can be lifted 
if the petitioner can demonstrate extraordinary circumstances beyond his control 
that caused the missed deadline, as well as diligence in pursuing relief in the 
federal courts.46 In contrast, the doctrine of cause and prejudice does not require a 
showing of diligence on the part of the petitioner. 47 
The fact that courts do not apply the doctrine of cause and prejudice to the 
AEDPA statute of limitations has resulted in inconsistent results in cases with 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 ( 1986). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991). 
42. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845. 
43. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l) ("A I-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period 
shall run from the latest of-(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (8) the date on which the impediment to 
filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 
removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the 
constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered 
through the exercise of due diligence.") 
44. § 2244(d)(2). 
45. See, e.g., Holland, 560 U.S. at 653. 
46. Id. 
47. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986). 
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nearly identical facts. In Maples v. Thomas,48 the Supreme Court held that 
counsel's abandonment of a death-sentenced, post-conviction petitioner consti-
tutes "cause" for a procedural default under the Court's cause and prejudice 
doctrine.49 To date, no court has held that the doctrine of cause and prejudice 
applies to a statute of limitations default.so Therefore, Mr. Myers was required to 
satisfy the criteria for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.s1 
Ill. MAPLES 
In Maples, the petitioner was represented by two attorneys at Sullivan & 
Cromwell, a large New York law firm, and John Butler, a local attorney in 
Huntsville, Alabama. Counsel filed a petition for state post-conviction relief 
pursuant to the Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. By the time the trial 
court denied the petition, both New York attorneys had left Sullivan & Cromwell 
for other employment. The agreement between the New York attorneys and 
Mr. Butler was that he would serve only as a mechanism for the pro hac vice 
admission of the New York attorneys and would provide no substantive role in 
the case. Notice of the trial court's denial of Mr. Maples' Rule 32 petition was 
mailed to Sullivan & Cromwell and returned. An identical notice was mailed to 
Mr. Butler, but he assumed that the New York attorneys would take appropriate 
action. After a notice of appeal was not filed, the Office of the Alabama Attorney 
General notified Mr. Maples that a critical deadline had been missed and 
informed him that only four weeks remained before the deadline to file a petition 
for federal habeas relief remained. s2 After receiving this letter, Mr. Maples called 
his mother and new counsel was obtained.s3 Mr. Maples did not make any effort 
to monitor his own case prior to his receipt of the State's letter.s4 While a timely 
petition for federal habeas relief was filed, because the claims raised in the 
Rule 32 Petition were not presented to the Alabama appellate courts, those claims 
were deemed procedurally defaulted.ss 
48. 132 s. Ct. 912 (2012). 
49. A procedural default occurs when a claim has not been presented to every appropriate state court 
and at the time there is no available means by which to present the claim in state court. Id. at 927. 
50. However, as discussed more fully below, in United States v. Montano, 381 F.3d 1265, 1268-69, 
1272-73, 1274 n.8 (l lth Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Montano, 398 F.3d 
1276 (l lth Cir. 2005), the Eleventh Circuit seemed to imply without discussion that a statute of 
limitations default could be overcome by a showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence. 
51. Myers, 420 Fed. App'x at 928. 
52. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 920 ("[O]n August 13, 2003 ... the attorney representing the State in 
Maples' collateral review proceedings, sent a letter directly to Maples ... [informing him] of the missed 
deadline for initiating an appeal within the State's system, and [notifying] him that four weeks remained 
during which he could file a federal habeas petition. Hayden mailed the letter to Maples only, using his 
prison address. No copy was sent to Maples' attorneys of record, or to anyone else acting on Maples' 
behalf.") (internal citations omitted). 
53. Id. ("Upon receiving the State's letter, Maples immediately contacted his mother."). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 927. 
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The lower courts held that attorney abandonment could not constitute cause for 
a procedural default. In so holding the lower courts relied on the Supreme Court's 
decision in Coleman v. Thompson which held that ineffectiveness of post-
conviction counsel could not constitute cause for a procedural default.56 The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that attorney abandonment can constitute cause 
for a procedural default. 
IV. THE CASE OF ROBIN MYERS 
Robin Myers was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in 
Morgan County, Alabama for the 1991 murder of Ludie Mae Tucker. 57 
Mr. Myers' conviction and death sentence were upheld by the Alabama Court of 
Criminal Appeals58 and the Supreme Court of Alabama. 59 The Supreme Court 
of the United States denied Mr. Myers' petition for review by that Court.60 
Represented by volunteer counsel from Tennessee, Mr. Myers filed a petition for 
post-conviction relief pursuant to Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.61 The 
petition was denied and volunteer counsel filed a timely appeal to the Alabama 
Court of Criminal Appeals.62 The appeal was denied and notice was mailed only 
to out-of-state volunteer counsel.63 At this point, volunteer counsel abandoned 
Mr. Myers.64 Mr. Myers was not aware that the Alabama Court of Criminal 
Appeals denied his appeal until he received a letter from the Office of the 
Alabama Attorney general notifying him that all relevant deadlines-both state 
and federal-had lapsed.65 With the help of other prisoners, Mr. Myers obtained 
new counsel and a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed in federal court 
in 2004.66 
In Mr. Myers' case, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the facts were strikingly 
similar to those the Supreme Court suggested would satisfy the "extraordinary 
circumstances" requirement in Holland v. Florida.67 However, the Eleventh 
Circuit did not reach the question of whether counsel's abandonment of 
Mr. Myers constituted extraordinary circumstances because the court found that 
56. 501 U.S. at 755. 
57. See Ex parte Myers, 699 So. 2d 1285, 1286 (Ala. 1997). While the jury returned a life verdict, the 
trial judge exercised his discretion and overrode the verdict and imposed a sentence of death. Id. 
58. See Myers v. State, 699 So. 2d 1281 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996). 
59. Id. at n.2. 
60. See Myers v. Alabama, 522 U.S. 1054 (1998). 
61. See Myers v. Allen, 420 Fed. App'x at 926. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. ("While Schwarz's inexcusable abandonment is strikingly similar to the "extraordinary 
circumstance" of abandonment in Holland, we need not reach that issue because Myers cannot show that 
he has exercise reasonable diligence in pursuing his rights."). 
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Mr. Myers did not exercise the requisite diligence.68 The court's ruling was based 
on the fact that Mr. Myers, who grew up in dire poverty and functions at 
approximately a second-grade level,69 had not made an effort to follow his case in 
state post-conviction.70 No such diligence requirement is imposed on a petitioner 
where the applicable test was cause and prejudice. 
The result is that while some prisoners sentenced to death will have their 
claims receive a full review on the merits in federal court, Mr. Myers, whose case 
was rejected by the Supreme Court,71 will likely be executed. The disparate 
results demonstrate how the current focus on complex procedural rules can have 
fundamentally unfair results. 
A. Post-Conviction Counsel's Abandonment of Mr. Myers 
The United States Supreme Court denied Mr. Myers' Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari on January 12, 1998.72 At that point, the clock began to run on the 
AEDPA statute of limitations.73 Mr. Myers had 365 days from the Supreme 
Court's denial of his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to file a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus in federal court.74 Because the AEDPA statute of limitations 
is tolled during state post-conviction proceedings,75 it was imperative that 
Mr. Myers' counsel file a state post-conviction petition before the one-year 
deadline expired. It was equally critical that the case remain "properly filed" in 
state court, meaning that all appeals and motions for rehearing had to be filed in a 
timely manner.76 If a state procedural rule was not followed and a state deadline 
missed, the case would no longer be "properly filed" in state court and the 
AEDPA clock would start to run again.77 
In January 1998, Earle Schwarz, an attorney in private practice in Tennessee, 
agreed to take his first capital case.78 Mr. Schwarz was made aware of the extent 
68. Id. 
69. See Testimony at the evidentiary hearing held in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Alabama on October 10-12, 2006 (on file with author). 
70. Myers v. Allen, 420 Fed. App'x at 928 ("Myers claims that his cognitive impairments and reliance 
on counsel who had abandoned him made it reasonable for Myers to do nothing until he learned that his 
execution was scheduled. Although Myers's circumstances do yield a very low bar for what level of 
diligence is reasonable, he still bears the burden of showing he did something to at least attempt to inquire 
into the status of his case."). 
71. Myers v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 2771 (2012) (denying Mr. Myers' petition for a writ of certiorari). 
72. Myers v. Alabama, 522 U.S. 1054 (1998). 
73. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(I). 
74. § 2244(d)(l)(a). 
75. § 2244(d)(2). 
76. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 236 (2002) (holding that a petitioner's claim is "pending" for 
the entire term of state court review, including those intervals between one state court's judgment and the 
filing of an appeal with a higher state court). 
77. Id. 
78. See Letter from Elisabeth Semel, Director, American Bar Association Death Penalty Representa-
tion Project, to Earle J. Schwarz (Jan. 31, 1998) (on file with the author) [hereinafter January 31 Letter]; 
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of his obligations as counsel to a death-sentenced inmate.79 In July 1998, 
Mr. Schwarz agreed to accept an Alabama case, and thereby committed himself 
to representing Mr. Myers in all state and federal post-conviction proceedings.80 
On December 17, 1998, Mr. Schwarz filed a timely Petition for Relief Pursuant 
to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure in the Morgan County 
Circuit Court (Rule 32 Petition).81 As described in Part II, this is the initial step in 
obtaining post-conviction relief in state court. A petitioner must pursue post-
conviction relief in the state court before he files a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in federal court.82 The Circuit Court denied Mr. Myers' petition and Mr. 
Schwarz filed a timely notice of appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal 
Appeals.83 Mr. Myers' appeal was denied by the Alabama Court of Criminal 
Appeals on February 21, 2003.84 
After appealing the denial of Mr. Myers' Rule 32 petition to the Alabama Court 
of Criminal Appeals, Mr. Schwarz abandoned the case. Mr. Schwarz never 
informed Mr. Myers that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals had denied his 
appeal.85 Mr. Schwarz did not tell Mr. Myers that he would not pursue relief on 
his behalf in the Alabama Supreme Court or in federal court.86 After the Alabama 
Court of Criminal Appeals denied Mr. Myers' appeal, Mr. Schwarz had no further 
contact with Mr. Myers; he never informed Mr. Myers that he was no longer 
representing him.87 
Mr. Schwarz admitted his abandonment of Mr. Myers in a Declaration 
submitted in federal court. 88 This Declaration was submitted as an attachment to 
Mr. Myers' Opposition to the State's Motion to Dismiss his petition for federal 
habeas relief on the ground that it was untimely. 
B. Subsequent litigation 
Because Mr. Schwarz had represented Mr. Myers competently for almost five 
years, and had kept him informed of all developments in the case, Mr. Myers 
believed that his case remained pending on appeal. As Mr. Myers' deadlines ran 
Declaration of Earle J. Schwarz at 'II 2, Myers v. Campbell, No. CV-04-C-618-NE (N.D. Ala. Sep. 27, 
2004) [hereinafter Declaration of Earl Schwarz). 
79. January 31 Letter, supra note 78, at 4 ("[i)f relief is denied by the state judge-and you must 
assume it will be-your firm will be expected to follow the case through proceedings in federal court and, 
ultimately, clemency if habeas efforts fail"). 
80. See Letter from Elisabeth Semel, Director, American Bar Association, to Earle J. Schwarz 
(July 13, 1998) (on file with the author). 
81. See 420 Fed. App'x at 926. 
82. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(l)(A). 
83. See Myers v. State, 699 So. 2d 1281, 1281 (1996). 
84. Id. 
85. Declaration of Earle J. Schwarz, supra note 78, at 'II 6. 
86. Id. at 'II 9. 
87. Id. 
88. See id. 
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one after another, he sat on death row unaware of what was happening with his 
case. While this situation could have been prevented if the state court had sent 
notice of its decision directly to Mr. Myers, it sent notice only to the volunteer 
attorney in Tennessee who had already abandoned him.89 Mr. Myers only learned 
that that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied his appeal when he 
received a Jetter from the Office of the Alabama Attorney General notifying him 
that all state and federal deadlines had run.90 
With the assistance of other prisoners, Mr. Myers obtained new counsel.91 
On March 25, 2004, Mr. Myers filed his initial federal habeas petition in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.92 The 
State moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was untimely.93 The 
State argued that Mr. Myers' petition was untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(l)(A) because it had not been filed within one year of the conclusion 
of direct review in the case.94 In opposition to the State's Motion, counsel for 
Mr. Myers argued, inter alia, that counsel's abandonment and the failure of the 
State court to provide direct notice of its decision to Mr. Myers both warranted 
equitable tolling,95 and constituted cause for the statute of limitations default. 
After several years of litigation, the district court dismissed Mr. Myers' 
petition for federal habeas relief as untimely. The district court found that the 
circumstances did not warrant equitable tolling and declined to apply a cause and 
prejudice analysis to the AEDPA statute of limitations. The Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed, holding that Mr. Myers had not been diligent in pursuing post-
conviction relief96 despite the fact that he suffers from severe impairments in 
intellectual functioning and is functionally illiterate. The United States Supreme 
Court denied Mr. Myers' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in 2012.97 
C. Contrast with Maples 
As set forth above, Mr. Myers did not receive a Jetter from the Office of the 
Alabama Attorney General until after the AEDPA statute of limitations had 
expired. This fact resulted in his petition for federal habeas relief being filed late. 
Therefore, under prevailing Supreme Court case Jaw, Mr. Myers was required to 
satisfy the requirements for equitable tolling, including diligence. The focus of 
89. See ALA. R. Arr. P. l 7(a) (service of notice of orders on a party represented by counsel shall be 
made on counsel). 
90. See Letter from Office of Alabama Attorney General to Earle Schwarz (Feb. 13, 2004) (on file with 
the author). 
91. See Myers, 420 Fed. App'x at 926. 
92. Id. 
93. See State's Motion to Dismiss Habeas Petition as Untimely (on file with the author). 
94. Id. 
95. The AEDPA statute of limitations is a non-jurisdictional statute of limitations that can be equitably 
tolled. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010). 
96. See Myers, 420 Fed. App'x at 928. 
97. Myers v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 2771 (2012). 
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the Eleventh Circuit on Mr. Myers' alleged failure to monitor his own case 
highlights the disparity between the outcome in Mr. Myers' case and in Maples. 
Like Mr. Myers, Mr. Maples took no action to follow his case or find substitute 
counsel until he received the State's letter.98 In Mr. Myers' case, the courts saw 
this as a basis to deny equitable tolling. 
As detailed above, Mr. Myers' attorney, Earle Schwarz, was court-appointed 
and did not follow the rules required for appointed counsel to withdraw.99 In 
Maples, Justice Ginsberg focused on the fact that Mr. Maples' attorneys were also 
court-appointed and similarly failed to follow the rules governing withdrawal by 
appointed counsel. 100 While the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged Mr. Schwarz's 
"inexcusable abandonment," in Mr. Myers' case, it concluded that Mr. Myers' 
federal habeas petition was untimely due to his purported Jack of diligence. 101 
In Maples, Justice Ginsberg also noted the fact that the clerk of court took no 
steps in order to ensure that Mr. Maples' received notice of a critical decision in 
his case. 102 As set forth above, the court clerk in Mr. Myers' case did not send a 
copy of the decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals directly to 
Mr. Myers. 103 
In Maples, the Supreme Court focused on counsel's abandonment of their 
client and failed to place the consequences for that abandonment at Mr. Maples' 
"death-cell door." 104 The Court held that counsel's abandonment of their client in 
violation of all applicable rules along with the trial court's failure to notify 
Mr. Maples of a key decision in his case constituted cause for the procedural 
default of the claims raised in the state trial court in post-conviction but not 
presented to the State's appellate courts. 105 Not only did the Supreme Court find 
that counsel's abandonment of their client constituted cause for the procedural 
default, the Court held this despite the fact that Mr. Maples was also represented 
by a local attorney. 106 It was undisputed that local counsel received notice of 
the trial court's decision, but the Supreme Court accepted at face value the 
representation that local counsel's role was simply to provide a mechanism for 
98. Id. ("Upon receiving the State's letter, Maples immediately contacted his mother."). 
99. See generally Declaration of Earle J. Schwarz, supra note 78. 
I 00. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 919 (Seven months after the last action taken by the trial court, Mr. Maples' 
court-appointed attorneys "left [the law firm in New York at which they were associates) ... Neither 
attorney told Maples of their departure ... or of their resulting inability to continue to represent him. In 
disregard of Alabama law, neither attorney sought the trial court's leave to withdraw. Compounding [the 
attorneys') inaction, no other ... lawyer entered an appearance on Maples' behalf, moved to substitute 
counsel, or otherwise notified the court of any change in Maples' representation.") (internal citations 
omitted). 
IOI. See generally Myers, 420 Fed. App'x 924. 
102. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 919 (2011). 
103. See supra Part IV.B. 
104. Maples, 132S.Ct.at917. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
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the New York attorneys to be admitted pro hac vice. J07 Mr. Schwarz did not have 
a local attorney move his admission pro hac vice, 108 therefore, Mr. Myers did not 
have the extra protection of having his case monitored by a local attorney. In 
addition, nothing in the Court's opinion in Maples indicates that Mr. Maples 
suffered from the type of severe cognitive deficits that afflict Mr. Myers. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg held that "[a]bandoned by counsel, 
Maples was left unrepresented at a critical time for his state postconviction 
petition, and he lacked a clue of any need to protect himself pro se. In these 
circumstances, no just system would lay the default at Maples' death-cell 
door." 109 Despite nearly identical facts, the Court in Maples granted relief after 
focusing on counsel's abrogation of their most basic duties to their client. 110 In 
stark contrast, the Eleventh Circuit denied relief in Mr. Myers' case because 
it focused on Mr. Myers' purported failure to monitor his own case. No such 
duty was imposed on Mr. Maples. "[H]abeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable 
remedy." 111 The disparate result results in Maples and Myers highlight the 
inequitable results that follow when courts apply different tests to procedural and 
statute of limitations defaults caused by counsel abandonment. 
V. THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSE AND PREJUDICE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THE 
AEDPA STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
In Maples v. Thomas, 112 the Supreme Court held that counsel's abandonment 
of a death-sentenced post-conviction petitioner constitutes "cause" for a proce-
dural default under the Court's cause and prejudice doctrine. 113 As described in 
Part IV, Mr. Myers was likewise abandoned by his attorney. Mr. Myers was not 
granted relief, however, because, in his case, attorney abandonment caused a 
statute of limitations default rather than a procedural default. 
AEDPA is a non-jurisdictional statute, thus its statute of limitations can be 
equitably tolled. 114 The Supreme Court held in Holland v. Florida that equitable 
tolling requires that a petitioner demonstrate extraordinary circumstances and 
diligence. 115 The courts reviewing Mr. Myers case held that, despite significant 
cognitive impairments, the fact that Mr. Myers did not take any steps to protect 
his rights until he received a letter from the State informing him that all of his 
107. Id. at 919. 
108. See Order Admitting Earle J. Schwarz to practice pro hac vice dated April 23, 1999 (on file with 
the author). 
109. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 917. 
110. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 659 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) ("Common sense dictates 
that a litigant cannot be held constructively responsible for the conduct of an attorney who is not 
operating as his agent in any meaningful sense of that word.") 
111. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995). 
112. 132S.Ct.912(2012). 
113. Id. 
114. See Holla11d, 560 U.S. at 644-46. 
115. Id. 
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deadlines had run required a finding that he was not diligent. Thus, equitable 
tolling was denied. Barring clemency or another form of relief in a successor 
petition, Mr. Myers will be executed without any federal review of his conviction 
and death sentence. The difference in result between Mr. Myers' case and that of 
Maples demonstrates that the jurisprudence governing post-conviction relief 
for death-sentenced inmates is still rife with the arbitrariness identified by the 
Court in Furman v. Georgia 116 when it struck down capital punishment in its 
then-existing form. 
Applying a cause and prejudice analysis to the AEDPA statute of limitations 
would create consistency between the rules governing procedural defaults, 
decrease the arbitrariness in the system and allow courts to review on the merits 
claims raised by post-conviction petitioners who were unable to meet the federal 
statute of limitations because they were abandoned by their attorney. There is 
no reason a capital post-conviction petitioner should be able to have a procedural 
default cured due to attorney abandonment but be executed if such abandon-
ment causes a statute of limitations default. This distinction is especially critical 
in cases in which the petitioner is cognitively impaired because such impairments 
make it much more difficult-if not impossible-to satisfy the diligence 
requirement for equitable tolling. 
A. Reducing Discrepancies Between Similar Cases 
Prior to the enactment of AEDPA, under Supreme Court case law, claims that 
were procedurally defaulted in state court could be reviewed by a federal habeas 
court upon a showing of cause and prejudice. 117 While AEDPA did not codify the 
doctrine of cause and prejudice, courts have continued to apply it to procedural 
bars post-AEDPA. 118 The reason cause and prejudice was not applied to the 
statute of limitations prior to AEDPA is simply because that there was no federal 
statute of limitations prior to AEDPA. 119 Logically, if cause and prejudice applies 
to a procedural default, there is no reason it should not apply to a statute of 
limitations default, especially in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Holland 
that the statute is not jurisdictional. 120 
Both Holland and Maples relied on an agency analysis. 121 Once an attorney 
abandons her client, she is no longer acting as her client's agent and her acts 
cannot be imputed to that client. Even though the State does not have a 
constitutional obligation to provide counsel to indigent post-conviction petition-
116. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
117. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 ( 1977); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 ( 1986). 
118. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004). 
119. See HERT/. & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, at§ 5.2 ("Until 1996 [the year AEDPA was enacted], there 
was no fixed statute of limitations for filing federal habeas corpus petitions.") 
120. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 654(2010) (holding that the AEDPA statute of limitations 
is non-jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled). 
121. Holland, 560 U.S. at 659; Maples, 132 S. Ct. 912, 915 (2011). 
378 The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy [Vol. XXI 
ers, it must "assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present 
his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process."122 The Supreme 
Court has consistently utilized a due process framework to analyze claims 
concerning access to the courts for indigent petitioners pursuing discretionary 
appeals and post-conviction relief. 123 
While a State has great discretion in devising means to assure that indigent 
defendants have an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly in post-
conviction, "when a State opts to act in a field where its action has significant 
discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accordance with the dictates 
of the Constitution and, in particular, in accordance with the Due Process 
Clause."124 A body of Supreme Court case law demonstrates that state law and 
procedure governing state post-conviction must comply with the Federal Due 
Process Clause. 
In Pennsylvania v. Finley, 125 the Supreme Court reviewed Pennsylvania's 
post-conviction system. The Court held that the petitioner had not been denied 
the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause where appointed 
post-conviction counsel reviewed the record, consulted with his client, deter-
mined that there were no meritorious issues, notified the trial court of his 
conclusions in writing, and requested permission to withdraw. 126 The peti-
tioner in Finley argued that the failure of appointed post-conviction counsel to 
follow the procedure required by Anders v. California, 127 violated his right to 
due process. 128 In holding that the petitioner had not been deprived of his 
constitutional rights, the Finley Court reaffirmed that post-conviction petitioners 
have a right to the "fundamental fairness exacted by the Due Process Clause." 129 
Because the "respondent [had] received exactly that which she [was] entitled to 
receive under state law-an independent review of the record by competent 
counsel-she cannot claim any deprivation without due process."130 
The Supreme Court held that there was no due process violation in Finley 
because the petitioner "received exactly that which she [was] entitled to receive 
122. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 ( 1974 ). 
123. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987) (holding that conduct of appointed 
post-conviction attorney comported with "fundamental fairness" guaranteed by the Due Process Clause); 
Ross, 417 U.S. at 610-11 (holding that Due Process Clause did not require appointment of counsel to 
indigent defendants to pursue discretionary appeals); Murray v Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (applying 
due process analysis of Finley to death-sentenced, post-conviction petitioners). 
124. Finley, 481 U.S. at 558 (quoting Evitts v. lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985)). 
125. 481U.S.551 (1987). 
126. Finley, 481 U.S. at 553. 
127. 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (Counsel seeking to withdraw must seek permission from the court. A brief 
referring to "anything in the record that might arguably support an appeal" must accompany such request. 
A copy of the be "should be furnished to the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he 
chooses; the court-not counsel-then proceeds .... "). 
128. Finley, 481 U.S. at 553-554. 
129. Id. at555. 
130. Id. at 558. 
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under state law." 131 Mr. Myers, however, did not receive exactly that which 
he was entitled to receive under state law. Under the Alabama rules, once 
Mr. Schwarz was appointed to represent Mr. Myers, he was obligated to continue 
to represent him in the Alabama state courts through all appeals unless he was 
relieved of this obligation by an order of the trial court. 132 While pro se 
petitioners receive notice of decisions in their cases directly from the court, 
represented parties do not. 133 In the case of a represented party, only counsel 
of record receives notice of the decision of an Alabama appellate court. 134 
Mr. Schwarz did not withdraw as required under the Alabama rules. As with 
counsel in Maples, he remained counsel of record and the Alabama Court of 
Criminal Appeals only sent notice of its decision to him. Because Mr. Schwarz 
simply terminated his representation of Mr. Myers without notice to anyone, 
Mr. Myers did not learn that his appeal had been denied until he received the 
State's letter more than one year later. The fact that the state court only sent notice 
to an out-of-state volunteer attorney who had abandoned Mr. Myers' case in 
violation of Alabama rules deprived Mr. Myers of precisely what he was entitled 
to receive under Alabama law: notice of a critical decision in his case. 135 
Cause for a procedural default exists whenever "something external to the 
petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him" results in the 
"default."136 Attorney error at a stage of a criminal proceeding at which counsel 
is not constitutionally guaranteed cannot constitute cause. This is because an 
attorney normally acts as the agent of his client. Absent a constitutional violation, 
the error of the attorney is imputed to the client and is not external. 137 The statute 
of limitations default here was caused because Mr. Myers never received notice 
of the decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. At the time the court 
issued its decision, Mr. Schwartz was "no longer representing" Mr. Myers and 
was not acting as Mr. Myers' agent. 138 Because Mr. Schwarz was not acting as 
Mr. Myers' agent at the time the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued its 
decision, his conduct cannot be imputed to Mr. Myers. 
In contrast, at earlier stages of the case, where the defendant has a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, "[i]f the procedural default is the result of in-
effective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that 
131. Id. at 558. 
132. See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 6.2 (requiring appointed counsel to file a motion seeking permission to 
withdraw); ALA. R. APP. P. 24(b)( I) ("[a)ppointed trial counsel shall continue as defendant's counsel on 
appeal unless relieved by order of the trial court"). 
133. ALA. R. APP. P. I 7(a). 
134. Id. 
135. See supra Part IV (discussing that notices of decisions are only sent to counsel if a party is 
represented). If a petitioner is proceeding prose, then notices of decisions must be sent directly to him. 
The rules thus provide that both represented and pro se petitioners receive notices of decisions in their 
cases. 
136. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991) (emphasis in original). 
137. Id. at 753. 
138. Declaration of Earle J. Schwarz, supra note 78, at 'II 9. 
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responsibility for the default be imputed to the State." 139 It "is not the gravity of 
the attorney's error that matters, but that it constitutes a violation of the 
petitioner's right to counsel, so that the error must be seen as an external factor, 
i.e. 'imputed to the State.".i4o Under Coleman, any conduct by an attorney that 
causes a violation of his client's constitutional rights must be imputed to the 
State. Because Mr. Schwarz's conduct caused a violation of Mr. Myers' 
Fourteenth Amendment rights, Coleman requires that Mr. Schwarz's conduct 
"must be seen as an external factor" that is "imputed to the State." 141 That the 
state court did not send notice of its decision directly to Mr. Myers is external to 
Mr. Myers. 142 
This reasoning demonstrates that there is no reason a statute of limitations 
default should be treated differently than a procedural default. Applying a cause 
and prejudice analysis to the AEDPA statute of limitations would create 
consistency between the different rules governing different types of defaults, and 
would decrease the arbitrariness in the system. There is no reason a capital 
post-conviction petitioner should be able to have a procedural default cured due 
to attorney abandonment but be executed if such abandonment causes a statute of 
limitations default instead. 
139. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 754 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 ( 1986). 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 752 (defining conduct external to a petitioner as "something that cannot fairly be attributed 
to him"). 
